Machine learning algorithms for prediction are increasingly being used in critical decisions a ecting human lives. Various fairness formalizations, with no rm consensus yet, are employed to prevent such algorithms from systematically discriminating against people based on certain a ributes protected by law. e aim of this article is to survey how fairness is formalized in the machine learning literature for the task of prediction and present these formalizations with their corresponding notions of distributive justice from the social sciences literature. We provide theoretical as well as empirical critiques of these notions from the social sciences literature and explain how these critiques limit the suitability of the corresponding fairness formalizations to certain domains. We also suggest two notions of distributive justice which address some of these critiques and discuss avenues for prospective fairness formalizations.
INTRODUCTION
Discrimination refers to unfavourable treatment of people due to the membership to certain demographic groups that are distinguished by the a ributes protected by law (henceforth, protected a ributes). A discriminatory action may be direct or indirect [81] . A direct discrimination is said to occur when a person is treated less favorably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on account of a protected a ribute. An indirect discrimination is said to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons with protected a ribute(s) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons. Discrimination can occur simultaneously based on two or more a ributes [26] .
Discrimination, based on many a ributes and in several domains, is prohibited by international legislation. e European Union (EU) have formalized legislation (e.g. Directive 2000/43/EC, Directive 2000/78/EC/, Directive 2002/73/EC, Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Protocol 12/Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights) to achieve non-discrimination on account of the protected a ributes such as race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender, sex, 1 disability, marital status, genetic features, 1 roughout this article, we follow the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, "Gender is cultural . . . Sex is biological. " , . . DOI: language and age [25, 46, 47] . e domains included in the legislation include education, employment, access to housing, public services, health care, adoption, credit and insurance. In the USA, a number of federal non-discrimination laws exist to prevent discrimination in similar domains [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] . Similar legal frameworks are present in many other countries too [64, 70, 71] .
Nowadays, machine learning algorithms are increasingly being used in high-impact domains such as credit, employment, education, and criminal justice which are prone to discrimination. If the observed human behaviors that dictate how an algorithm transforms input into output are awed, the ability of the modern computing devices to swi ly replicate decision-making can lead to magnifying erroneous behavior [9] . Barocas and Selbst [6] , Citron and Pasquale [12] , Edelman and Luca [24] , Kay et al. [42] and Sweeney [65] show that algorithms can make discriminatory decisions even if the computing process is well-intentioned. is is because, as Barocas and Selbst [6] assert, the training data "may simply re ect the widespread biases that persist in society at large . . . data mining can discover surprisingly useful regularities that are really just preexisting pa erns of exclusion and inequality". A report released by the US Government [27] states that discrimination can sometimes "be the inadvertent outcome of the way big data technologies are structured and used" and points toward "the potential of encoding discrimination in automated decisions". e goal of fairness in prediction with machine learning is to design algorithms that make fair predictions devoid of discrimination. e aim of this article is to survey how fairness is formalized in the machine learning literature for the task of prediction and present these formalizations with their corresponding notions from the social sciences literature. Given that the outcomes of the prediction are decisions about social bene ts like education, employment and health-care, the fairness formalizations in the machine learning literature correspond to the notions of distributive justice from the social sciences literature. Since, some formalizations of fairness can be con icting with others, the predictions produced by the algorithms using them would vastly di er as well. As these machine learning prediction algorithms are being used in high-impact domains, their predictions have far-reaching effects on the society. erefore, from the practical point of view, it is important to study how fairness is formalized in the machine learning literature and the implications of various formalizations. To this end, we present theoretical as well as empirical critiques of their corresponding notions from the social sciences literature. e co-presentation of the formalizations from the machine learning literature and the corresponding critiques from the social sciences literature is with the intention to assist in the following two tasks:
(1) To determine the suitability of the existing formalizations of fairness in machine learning literature. To forge the way for newer formalizations, we nominate two notions from the social sciences literature which answer some of the critiques of the existing formalizations in the machine learning literature.
For how the fairness (or alternatively discrimination) is measured, we point the readers toŽliobaitė [82] . For a multidisciplinary survey on discrimination analysis, we recommend Romei and Ruggieri [58] . In the context of this article, we are mainly interested in the theories of distributive justice from the social science literature. Covering them all in detail is beyond the scope of this article. Roemer [57] provide an overview of this topic from the perspective of both economics and philosophy. From the point of view of legislation, an overview and analysis of fairness is provided by Franck [28] .
In Section 2, we state the mathematical formulation of the problem of prediction with machine learning. In Section 3, we review the fairness formalizations in the literature of prediction with machine learning with their corresponding notions of distributive justice from the social sciences literature. We also provide critiques and analyses of these notions and explain how these critiques limit the suitability of these formalizations to certain domains. In Section 4, we illustrate the di erences among the surveyed fairness formalizations with the help of a prediction scenario. As an a empt to answer some of critiques of previous fairness formalizations, we propose two prospective notions of fairness in Section 5. Lastly, in Section 6, we discuss avenues for prospective fairness formalizations.
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
Let X be a set of individuals. We term X as the population. e individuals in the population are divided into several groups depending upon the protected a ributes. Each of the individuals can be assigned an outcome. We denote the set of outcomes by A. Formally, the outcome set could be continuous, but in practice the case with nite number of outcomes is of importance in many applications. Consequently, most of the literature has focused on problem se ings with nite number of outcomes and so will this article. In the simplest case, the outcome is binary i.e. A = {0, 1}. Some of the prediction outcomes are considered to be more bene cial or desirable than others. If that is not the case, all the outcomes are equivalent and there can be no discrimination in assigning them to the individuals.
For an individual x i ∈ X , let i be the true outcome (also called as label, in the literature) to be predicted. A (possibly randomized) predictor can be represented by a mapping H : X → A from population X to the set of outcomes A, such that H (x i ) is the predicted outcome for individual x i . D 1. (Group-conditional predictor) A group-conditional predictor consists of a set of mappings, one for each group of the pop-
e accuracy of a predictor H is computed as
where the probability is computed over a distribution of the population. As maximizing the accuracy of a predictor is in the bene t of the decision-maker using it, it is also termed as utility ( [79] ). Next, we will see the a empts to formalize fairness with the above de nition of the problem.
WHAT IS FAIR? (FORMALIZATIONS OF FAIRNESS IN PREDICTION WITH MACHINE LEARNING)
e rst step in formalizing fairness in prediction with machine learning is to answer the following two questions:
• Parity or preference? : whether fairness means achieving parity or satisfying the preferences. • Treatment or impact? : whether fairness is to be maintained in treatment or impact (results).
Parity-based fairness formalizations typically correspond to egalitarianism, which is a school of thought that equates fairness with some form of equality of all people. Within egalitarianism, there are various notions of fairness in the social sciences literature, which in turn elicit the corresponding formalizations in the machine learning literature. Preference-based fairness formalizations, on the other hand, correspond to non-egalitarian doctrine of distributive justice. Next, we will see the existing formalizations of fairness in the machine learning literature and their corresponding notions from the social sciences literature. Table 1 summarizes how these formalizations answer the two questions presented above.
Treatment parity
Treatment parity as the name suggests, and as Table 1 shows, follows a particular notion of egalitarian fairness in treatment. It is formalized by the following de nition. D 2. (Treatment parity) A predictor is said to achieve treatment parity if the protected a ributes are not explicitly used in the prediction process.
Any predictor which is not group-conditional thus satis es this formalization of fairness. Treatment parity is appealing because, from the point of view of decision-maker using the predictor, it is easier to deploy rather than proving parity in treatment. However, when the a ributes most relevant for prediction overlap with the protected a ributes, treatment parity can lead to low accuracy and hence sub-optimal utility to the decision-maker.
A number of proposed predictors in the machine learning literature satisfy treatment parity ( [22, 45] ), while some don't ( [10, 34, 41] ). Pedreshi et al. [52] show that satisfying treatment parity is not a su cient condition to avoid discrimination when other background knowledge is available. Especially with the ubiquity of social media, there are many avenues for personal information including protected a ributes to be leaked from the information readily available in the public domain. Indeed, Korolova [43] note that using data available on Facebook pro les, one can infer user age, sexual orientation, religious a liation, etc. Kosinski et al. [44] show that it is possible to accurately predict a range of highly sensitive personal a ributes including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious views, age, and gender from easily accessible digital records of behaviour.
Furthermore, Calders andŽliobaitė [11] show how some of the assumptions made during the construction of a predictor might not hold in real-life scenarios with the help of ctitious examples. is mismatch leads to discrimination even when information about the protected a ributes is removed and prediction is guided by neutral arguments such as accuracy only.
From the point of view of distributive justice, treatment parity can be considered a naive way to achieve egalitarianism. In practice, treatment parity corresponds chie y to the approach of being "blind" to counter racial/gender discrimination. Bonilla-Silva [8] submit that discrimination is still possible against the protected group because of the structural barriers which hinder the protected groups. In particular, Bonilla-Silva [8] analyze the notion of race-blindness in terms of an important frame of abstract liberalism which is stated as the practice of invoking abstract ideals while ignoring concrete proposals to reduce inequality on the ground which results from systematic discrimination. Moreover, Bonilla-Silva [8] also extensively provide studies to document various discriminatory practices in the domains like education, housing, credit etc. Fryer et al. [29] provide a study to compare the e ciency of race-blind approach.
e study is based on a hypothetical experiment supposing that seven selected colleges would have had to admit only a fraction of as many students as were, in fact, admi ed. e problem is to choose which of the students to retain while achieving the goal of maintaining the original racial representation. e study shows that, while in the short run, race-blind approach is as e cient as race-conscious approach, in the long run, the former is less e cient than the la er. Taslitz [66] and the corresponding essays in the symposium articulate how discrimination is perpetuated in the American criminal justice system despite using the race-blind approach. Alternatively some studies show that a blind approach can sometimes work. For example, Goldin and Rouse [33] show that using blind auditions help in reducing the discrimination against women while hiring musicians in symphony orchestras. e above critiques challenge the suitability of treatment parity to domains in which,
• protected a ributes can be deduced readily from easily available non-protected a ributes, • structural barriers, which hinder the protected groups, are shown to be present by credible surveys.
Group fairness (Statistical/demographic parity)
As shown by Table 1 , group fairness follows a particular notion of egalitarian fairness in impact. It imposes the condition that the predictor should predict a particular outcome for individuals across groups with almost equal probability. D 3. (Group fairness) A predictor H : X → A is said to achieve group fairness with bias ϵ with respect to the groups S,T ⊆ X , ,
where O ⊆ A is any subset of outcomes.
From the above de nition it is clear that, group fairness, in fact, imposes the condition of statistical parity on the predictor. Statistical parity ensures that an individual belonging to a group of population is equally likely (up to bias ϵ) to receive a particular outcome as an individual belonging to another group of the population. If we choose S to be the group of individuals with protected a ributes and T = X \ S, statistical parity stipulates that the predictor treats the general population statistically similarly to the protected group. Statistical parity is also called as demographic parity as it makes the demographics of those receiving bene cial outcome almost identical to the demographics of the population as a whole.
Note that unlike some of the other formalizations of fairness, group fairness is independent of the "ground truth" i.e. the label information. is is particularly useful when reliable ground truth information is not available. is might be true in scenarios where the aggregation of historical manual decisions is used for training an automated predictor which will be used to predict the outcome for future cases. In domains like employment, housing, credit and criminal justice, discrimination against protected groups has been well-documented [13, 14, 49, 77] . erefore, disproportionality in the respective outcomes for individuals from protected group and non-protected group can not be justi ed based on historical data.
Alternatively in the cases where disproportianlity in the respective outcomes can be justi ed by using non-protected a ributes, imposing statistical parity leads to incorrect outcomes and may amount to discrimination against quali ed candidates. To illustrate this, let us consider the example given by Luong et al. [45] . Consider a job that requires a special driving license (in legal terms, a genuine occupational requirement). e predictor in this scenario takes resumes of the applicants and produces a binary outcome indicating whether they should be called for an interview. If most of the younger applicants have the required special driving license and most of the elder applicants do not have it, then unequal positive outcome rates across the age groups by the predictor can be justi ed by legally admissible a ributes.
Dwork et al. [22] indicate another de ciency of group fairness by noting that predictor is not stipulated to select the most "quali ed" individuals within the groups as long as it maintains statistical parity.
is might lead to the predictor being calibrated to give bene cial outcomes to unquali ed individuals from group S and quali ed individuals from group T. If the unquali ed individuals receiving bene cial outcomes cause reduced performance (measured by some criteria), an argument can be made to "justify" why individuals from the group S should not receive bene cial outcomes in the future. e formalization of group fairness follows from the notion of collectivist egalitarianism for distributive justice. In practice, the biggest (in terms of the number of people a ected) implementation of group fairness is the application of a rmative action ( [17] ) to address discrimination on the basis of caste ( [21] ) and gender 3 
. See
Weisskopf [78, Chapter 2] for arguments made for and against a rmative action polices in both India and the USA. Here we examine the evidence for some of them.
Bagde et al. [4] study the e ects of the a rmative action program which maintains group fairness with respect to the protected groups in admissions to educational institutes. e study shows that a rmative action has li le impact on on-time graduation which is the considered a measure of the performance of an admi ed student.
is nding goes against the opinion that a rmative action policies might harm the intended bene ciaries by placing them in academic situations for which they are poorly suited. To the contrary, the study nds positive change in the test scores of the bene ciaries of the a rmative action a er the rst year of the college. Galanter [32] provide another assessment of the a rmative action program. e major ndings of interest are as follows ( [16] ):
• A rmative action has helped in substantially redistributing the access to education and employment to wider spectrum of the society than earlier, although the redistribution is not evenly spread among the protected groups. • A rmative action has brought a signi cant increase in the number of people from the protected group having access to prominent social roles (e.g. in legislative bodies) that would otherwise be lacking. Further evidence for this was also provided by Pande [51] . • In the short run, people from protected group availing social bene ts through a rmative action might experience social rejection in workplace and educational institutes. Although, such social rejection exists independently and a rmative action may only magnify it. Moreover, in the long run, an increased level of education and employment weaken the stereotypical association of protected groups with incompetence and ignorance. Two of the standard objections to group fairness are:
• it is not meritocratic,
• the increased representation of the protected group o en comes at the cost of reduced e ciency. Regarding the rst claim, the equivalence of aptitude or merit with test scores can be questioned and furthermore social capital also contributes towards these test scores [20] . Moreover, the underlying assumption behind this claim is that the allocation of social bene ts without a rmative action is meritocratic. However, several studies [7, 18, 40, 50, 63, 68] have con rmed discrimination on the basis of protected a ributes.
For the second claim, several studies have been conducted to examine the supporting evidence with respect to the a rmative action policies in the USA. A survey of such studies by Holzer and Neumark [36] concludes that "the empirical case against A rmative Action on the grounds of e ciency is weak at best". In India, Deshpande and Weisskopf [19] study the e ect of a rmative action policies on the e ciency of the workforce of the Indian Railways -the world's largest employer subject to a rmative action. is study found no evidence to support the claim that increasing the proportion of the protected group by a rmative action policies leads to loss in e ciency. in the USA. However some of the points apply to the a rmative action program in the USA as well On formalizing fairness in prediction with machine learning , ,
Individual fairness
As Table 1 shows, individual fairness follows a particular notion of egalitarian fairness in impact. It ascertains that a predictor is fair if it produces similar outputs for similar individuals. Formally, it is de ned as follows:
Dwork et al. [22] use this notion of fairness. In their formulation of the problem, a predictor takes an individual x from the population as an input and outputs a probability distribution H (x) A over the set of outcomes A. In this formulation, individual fairness can be interpreted to mean that the distributions assigned to similar people are similar. e notion of individual fairness can be then captured by (D, d)-Lipschitz property which states that
where D is a distance measure for distributions. Furthermore, Dwork et al. [22] prove that if a predictor satis es (D, d)-Lipschitz property, then it also achieves statistical parity with certain bias. Luong et al. [45] use a similar notion for detecting discrimination. For each member in the protected group with negative outcome, they look for individuals with "similar" non-protected a ributes. If the outcomes for individuals from the protected group and non-protected group having "similar" non-protected a ributes are signi cantly di erent, then discrimination is said to have occurred. As in Dwork et al. [22] , the similarity is modeled by a distance metric.
In the social sciences literature, this notion of fairness can be traced back to Book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics. It can be called as individualism egalitarianism. According to Sacksteder [59] , this is the formal principle of justice. e idea of treating similar cases similarly is the central theme of the legal framework of most countries. As given by De nition 4, this notion delegates the responsibility of ensuring fairness from the predictor to the distance metric. If the distance metric uses the protected a ributes directly or indirectly to compute the distance between two individuals, a predictor satisfying De nition 4 would be deemed to be discriminative. erefore, the potency of this notion of fairness to prevent discrimination depends largely upon the distance metric used. Hence, individual fairness as stated above, can not be considered suitable for domains where reliable and non-discriminating distance metric is not available 4 .
Equality of opportunity
As shown in Table 1 , equality of opportunity follows a particular notion of egalitarian fairness in impact. In the literature of machine learning, the formalization of equality of opportunity was introduced by Hardt et al. [34] . An equivalent formalization was also proposed concurrently and independently by Zafar et al. [80] .
Let us consider the case of binary outcomes with a single bene cial outcome. For example, if the prediction task is to whether 4 Dwork et al. [22] have provided some approaches to build distance metrics. approve a loan application then "approving the loan" is the benecial outcome. Let us denote the bene cial outcome by = 1. D 5. (Equal opportunity) A predictor is said to satisfy equal opportunity with respect to group S i
It can be considered as a stipulation which states that the true positive rate should be the same for all the groups. e equivalent notion by Zafar et al. [80] , called disparate mistreatment, asks for the equivalence of misclassi cation rates across the groups.
In the social sciences literature, the corresponding notion was presented by Rawls [56] . e central feature of Rawlsian theory is the original position in which all the parties are deprived of their knowledge of their personal a ributes and social and historical circumstances (the so called "veil of ignorance"). e critique to this notion of fairness was provided by Arneson [2] . is essay states that equality of opportunity would not be able to cope with the following problems.
• Stunted ambition: In many parts of the world, members of the protected group are socially conditioned to accept that it is inappropriate for them to aspire to social bene ts including education, jobs and wealth. For example, women are shunted by their socialization toward elds of graduate study that are less well-funded, and that frequently o er poorer professional employment prospects [38] . Such impediments to social advantages are presented on account of other protected a ributes as well. For example, orat and Neuman [69] argue, on the basis of eld surveys and interviews, that protected caste groups face discrimination due to underlying a itudinal orientations. It is not obvious how equality of opportunity could avoid discrimination by social conditioning. • Selection by merit and bigotry: Bigotry among members of society might in uence what count as quali cations for positions of advantage. e notion of equality of opportunity has also been criticized for not considering the e ect of discrimination due to protected a ributes like gender [48] and race [62] as they are not included in the list of a ributes a ecting an individual's life prospects. It has been shown that the protected a ributes like race and gender a ect one's access to opportunities in domains such as education, business, politics in many parts of the world. For example, a comprehensive recent study states that 155 of the 173 economies covered have at least one law impeding women's economic opportunities [37] . e exclusion of a ributes like race and gender from the list of a ributes deemed to be a ecting an individual's life prospects in the notion of equality of opportunity thus calls into question its suitability to the domains in which there exists vast evidence that such a ributes do indeed a ect one's prospects.
Preference-based fairness
Zafar et al. [79] introduce two formalizations of fairness which follow particular notions of non-egalitarian fairness in impact and in treatment. In order to provide the de nitions for the same, the authors rst introduce the notion of group bene t.
Individuals Protected a ribute label
Predictors 6. (Group bene t) Group bene t of a predictor H for a particular group S of the population is de ned as expected proportion of individuals in the group S for whom the predictor H predicts the bene cial outcome.
Group bene t can also be de ned as the expected proportion of individuals from the group who receive the bene cial output for whom the true label is the same i.e.
Based on the above notion of group bene t, Zafar et al. [79] provide a formalization of fairness called preferred treatment which follows a notion of non-egalitarian fairness in treatment. D 7. (Preferred treatment) A group-conditional predictor H = {H S } S ⊂X is said to satisfy preferred treatment if each group of the population receives more bene t from their respective predictor then they would have received from any other predictor i.e.
for all S,T ⊂ X If a classi er is not group-conditional then, it by default satis es preferred treatment as H = H S for all S ⊂ X .
To compare the predictors, Zafar et al. [79] suggest the formalization of Preferred impact which follows a particular notion of non-egalitarian fairness in impact. In certain applications, there might not be a single universally accepted bene cial outcome. It is possible that a few individuals from a group may prefer another outcome than the one preferred by the majority of the group. In order to alleviate their concerns, the collectivist de nition of group bene t needs to be extended to account for individual preferences.
In the social sciences literature, the above notion corresponds to envy-freeness [3] . is notion of fairness is a ractive because it can be de ned in terms of ordinal preference relations of the utility values of the predictors. On the other hand, Holcombe [35] show that freedom from envy is neither necessary nor su cient for fairness. For many real-world problems, one needs to nd fair and e cient solutions amongst the groups. An e cient solution ensures the greatest possible bene t to the groups. In collective decision making problems, like the domain applications of prediction with machine learning, it can be formally expressed by the notion of Pareto-e ciency. A Pareto-e cient solution is such that there can be no increase in the bene t of one group without strictly decreasing the bene t of another group. However, it should be noted that deciding whether there is a Pareto-e cient envy-free allocation is computationally very hard even with simple additive preferences [15] .
ese critiques indicate that the suitability of such envy-free formalizations is limited only to the domains where such an e ective and envy-free allocation can be computed easily.
PREDICTORS USING VARIOUS FAIRNESS NOTIONS IN A FICTITIOUS SCENARIO
To demonstrate the fairness formalizations described above, let us see how predictors satisfying them would behave on a ctitious scenario. Assume that a population of {A, B, C, D, E, F } is evenly divided into two groups : group S with a ribute value s and group T with a ribute value t. Predictors H 1, H 2, H 3 and H 4 are employed to predict outcome for which reliable label information is available. Note that H 4 is group-conditional i.e. it uses H 4 S for an individual from group S and H 4 T for an individual from group T . Assume that a distance metric on the individuals is available for the predictors. Refer to Figure 2 for further exposition of this scenario. Next, we shall see which of the predictors satisfy the considered fairness formalizations:
(1) H 1, H 2 and H 3 satisfy treatment parity because they don't use the protected a ribute while H 3 doesn't satisfy treatment parity because it is group-conditional. (2) H 1 satis es group fairness as,
while the rest don't.
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(3) H 2 satis es individual fairness as A and B, who are close (similar) according to the distance metric, receive the same output 1, while the other individuals who are further away from A and B but close together receive the output 0. Other predictors assign dissimilar outputs to individuals who are similar according to the distance metric. (4) H 3 satis es equality of opportunity as,
(5) H 4 satis es preference treatment as, 
PROSPECTIVE NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS
In this section, we describe two prospective notions of fairness which haven't been considered in the literature of machine learning so far. Our intention to propose these notions is to address the following critique of the considered formalizations. As seen in Section 3, many of the past formalizations in the machine learning literature do not o set for the fact that social bene ts, for which the proposed prediction algorithms are used, are being allocated unequally among the people owing to the a ributes they had no say in. We suggest two of the notions from the literature of social sciences which address this concern.
5.1 Equality of resources Dworkin [23] propose the notion of equality of resources in which unequal distribution of social bene ts is only considered fair when it results from the intentional decisions and actions of the concerned individuals. is notion stipulates that the distribution of social bene ts to satisfy the following two properties:
• ambition-sensitive: each individual's ambitions and choices that follow them ascertains the bene ts they receive. • endowment-insensitive: each individual's unchosen circumstances including the natural endowments should be o set. If such circumstances a ect one's chances of achieving the social bene ts, then they should be compensated. In the second property, equality of resources di ers from equality of opportunity as the la er considers di erences in natural endowments (including the protected a ributes such as sex) as facts of nature which need not be adjusted to achieve fairness.
Equality of capability of functioning
Sen [61] extends the insight that people should not be held responsible for a ributes they had no say in to include personal a ributes which cause di culty in developing functionings. Functionings are states of "being and doing", that is, various states of existence and activities that an individual can undertake. For example, they vary from simple things from being well-nourished and being housed to more complex things such as being happy and having self-respect.
is notion calls for equalizing capabilities which are de ned as the set of valuable functionings that an individual has e ective access to. Put simply, functionings refer to what people really 'do and are'; capabilities denote what people potentially 'can do and can be'.
Sen [60, 61] argue that variations related to the protected attributes like age, sex, gender, race, caste give individuals unequal powers to achieve goals even when they have the same opportunities. In order to equalize capabilities, people should be compensated for their unequal powers to convert opportunities into functionings. To this point, it sounds similar to quality of resources described above. Crucially however, the notion of equality of capability calls for addressing inequalities due to social endowments (e.g. gender) as well as natural endowments (e.g. sex), in contrast to the equality of resources [53] .
One of the main strengths of this notion of fairness that it is exible which allows it to be developed and applied in many di erent ways [1] . Indeed, this notion has been used in the foundations of human development paradigm by the United Nations [30, 31] .
One of the major criticism of Equality of capability theory concerns the failure to identify of valuable capabilities [55] . Another criticism is that the informational requirement of this approach can be very high [1] . e second criticism applies to equality of resources as well and it makes exact mathematical formalizations of these notions a potentially di cult problem. However, the suitability of these prospective formalizations (unlike the current formalizations) to domains in which natural endowments or social endowments or both impede an individual's prospect to receive social bene ts makes the open problem of formalizing them worthwhile.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS
At the end of Plato's Republic I, Socrates says "So long as I do not know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not" [5] . To paraphrase Socrates, before conforming to a fairness formalization, we should accurately analyze it. As the eld of fairness in machine learning prediction algorithms is evolving rapidly, it is important for us analyze the fairness formalizations considered so far.
To this end, we juxtaposed the fairness notions considered so far in the machine learning literature with their corresponding theories of distributive justice in the social sciences literature. We saw the theoretical critique and analysis of these fairness notions from the social sciences literature. We outlined the performance of these fairness notions when they were used in a policy employed on a large population (e.g. group fairness in a rmative action). Such critiques of the formalizations and experimental studies of their use in large-scale practice serve as guiding principles while choosing the fairness formalizations to use in particular domains.
We also proposed two prospective notions of fairness, which have been studied extensively in the social sciences literature, for prediction with machine learning. Of course, we do not claim that these notions will serve as panacea for all the critiques of the notions already considered in the machine learning literature. Our intention behind nominating these notions is to initiate a discussion about fairness formalizations in prediction with machine learning which recognize the following -since individuals should not be held responsible for the attributes they can not change or had no say in, the social bene ts they receive, which in turn a ect their prospects in life, should not depend upon those attributes. If the machine learning prediction algorithms are used to make decisions about the social bene ts whose allocation exhibits discrimination for some people owing to the a ributes they had no say in, then the fairness formalizations should o set the existing discrimination due to such a ributes.
Of course, the obvious di culty lies in determining which attributes that an individual has no say in. Education, at rst glance, might seem like an a ribute that an individual can choose. However, several studies show that the a ributes that an individual has no say in (e.g. birth-place, race, caste) can impact the level of their education. For example, Jacobs [39] provide a comprehensive survey on education in the USA which demonstrates that women are particularly disadvantaged with respect to the outcomes of education. is can be seen in academia in the USA as women make up only 26% of full professors, 23% of university presidents and 14% of presidents of doctoral degree-granting institutions [54] . Similar gender disparity at higher echelons of positions is found in politics and business. Moreover, this is despite the fact that women fare relatively well in access to education in the USA. Indeed, 57% of all the college students in the USA are women [54] . However, easy access to education for women is not a universal phenomenon and discrimination is present in many parts of the world as con rmed by the Department of Economic and Social A airs, the United Nations [67, Chapter 3] . is leads to us another key insight that the level of discrimination varies with the domain (or even for di erent issues within a single domain as seen above) and the place of interest. us while proposing notions of fairness, credible surveys appraising the discrimination caused by the protected a ributes should be taken into consideration.
Which fairness formalizations should be used in for the prediction tasks corresponding to a particular social bene t should also depend upon whether the bene t in question can be considered as a basic human right. For domains like a ordable housing, essential health-care and basic education, fairness formalizations which actively try to remove disparity and provide bene ts to all the individuals should be considered. However, for other domains which require quali cations not evenly distributed in the population, a justi cation could be made for relaxing the stipulations. At the same time, independent e orts could be made to di use the ability to have such quali cations evenly in the population.
